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Abstract—In this letter, we investigate an intelligent reflecting
surface (IRS) assisted wireless secrecy communication system,
where an IRS is deployed nearby a single-antenna receiver to as-
sist in the secure transmission from a multi-antenna transmitter,
in the presence of multiple single-antenna eavesdroppers. Aiming
to maximize the achievable secrecy rate, a design problem for
jointly optimizing transmit beamforming with jamming and IRS
reflect beamforming is formulated, which is however difficult to
solve due to its non-convexity and coupled variables. We thus
propose an efficient algorithm based on alternating optimization
to solve the problem sub-optimally. Simulation results show that
incorporating jamming with artificial noise (AN) in transmit
beamforming is generally beneficial to improve the secrecy rate,
even under the new setup with IRS reflect beamforming.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, intelligent reflecting surface (IRS) has been pro-
posed as a key enabling technology for achieving a smart
and reconfigurable signal propagation environment in future
wireless networks [1]–[4]. Specifically, IRS is a metasurface
composed of a large number of low-cost passive reflecting ele-
ments. By adaptively adjusting the reflection amplitude and/or
phase shift of each element at an IRS, the strength and direc-
tion of the electromagnetic wave becomes highly controllable,
whereby the reflected signal can be intentionally enhanced
or weakened at different receivers. Moreover, IRS consumes
much less power than traditional active transceivers/relays
since it merely reflects signals without injecting any power
for amplification [1]. As a new promising solution to achieve
high beamforming gain with very low hardware/energy cost,
IRS has been applied in various wireless applications such
as coverage extension, interference cancellation, energy effi-
ciency enhancement, and so on (see [1] and the references
therein).
From the physical layer security perspective, IRS assisted
wireless secrecy communication was recently investigated in
[1], [5]–[8]. Via jointly designing the active transmit beam-
forming and the passive reflect beamforming of the IRS that
is usually deployed near the legitimate receiver, the achievable
secrecy rate can be significantly improved. However, the above
works mainly focused on the joint beamforming design using
various different optimization methods, while the transmit
jamming with artificial noise (AN) was not considered therein.
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Fig. 1: IRS-aided wireless secrecy communication.
AN is known to be an effective technique for enhancing
the secrecy rate in the conventional wireless system without
using the IRS, especially when the number of eavesdroppers
is larger than that of transmit antennas. This is because the
transmitter in this case lacks sufficient degrees of freedom
(DoF) to send the legitimate signal into the null space of
all the eavesdroppers’ channels, thus rendering the standalone
transmit beamforming ineffective [9]. This thus motivates the
current work to investigate the joint transmit beamforming
with AN and IRS reflect beamforming in an IRS-aided se-
crecy communication system, as shown in Fig. 1. We aim to
maximize the achievable secrecy rate of the considered system
and thereby investigate whether the additional DoF brought
by the IRS can have any impact on the necessity of using AN
in the joint beamforming design, which, to the authors’ best
knowledge, has not been addressed in the literature yet.
Notations: CN×M denotes the space of N ×M complex-
valued matrices. The distribution of a circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian random variable with mean µ and variance
σ2 is denoted by CN (µ, σ2); and ∼ stands for distributed as.
For a square matrix S, Tr(S) denotes its trace, while S  0
means that S is positive semi-definite. For any general matrix
M, rank(M) denotes its rank. For any complex number x,
∠(x) denotes its phase.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a wireless communication
system where a legitimate transmitter (Alice) intends to send
confidential information to a legitimate receiver (Bob) with
the help of an IRS (Rose) that is deployed nearby Bob,
against K eavesdroppers (Eves) that are arbitrarily distributed
in the system. Suppose that Bob and all Eves are equipped
with a single antenna, while the number of antennas at Alice
and that of reflecting elements at Rose are denoted by M
and N , respectively. The baseband equivalent channels from
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2Alice to Rose, Bob and Eve k (the k-th eavesdropper) are
denoted by Har ∈ CN×M , hHab ∈ C1×M and hHaek ∈ C1×M ,
respectively, while those from Rose to Bob and Eve k are
denoted by hHrb ∈ C1×N and hHrek ∈ C1×N , respectively.
Let Φ = diag
(
ejθ1 , ejθ2 , ...., ejθN
)
represent the diagonal
phase-shifting matrix of Rose, where in its main diagonal,
θn ∈ [0, 2pi) is the phase shift on the combined incident
signal by its n-th element, n = 1, ..., N [1], [2]. The com-
posite Alice-Rose-Bob/Eve k channel is then modeled as a
concatenation of three components, namely, the Alice-Rose
link, Rose’s reflection with phase shifts, and Rose-Bob/Eve k
link. To characterize the performance limit of the considered
IRS-assisted secrecy communication system, we assume that
the channel state information (CSI) of all channels involved
is perfectly known at Alice and Rose for their joint design of
transmit/reflect beamforming and jamming [2]. In addition, the
quasi-static flat-fading model is assumed for all the channels.
The transmitted signal from Alice is given by
x = f1s+ f2a, (1)
where s ∼ CN (0, 1) and a ∼ CN (0, 1) denote the inde-
pendent information and jamming/AN signals, respectively,
while f1 ∈ CM×1 and f2 ∈ CM×1 denote the beamforming
and jamming vectors, respectively. Assuming that Alice has
a maximum transmit power budget Pmax, we have fH1 f1 +
fH2 f2 ≤ Pmax. The signal received at Bob or Eve k is then
given by
yi=
(
hHai + h
H
riΦHar
)
(f1s+f2a)+ni, i ∈ {b, ek}, (2)
where ni ∼ CN
(
0, σ20
)
is the complex additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN). Let vH = [v1, v2, ..., vN ] where
vn = e
jθn , ∀n. By changing variables as hHriΦHar = vHHari
where Hari = diag
(
hHri
)
Har, the signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR) at Bob or Eve k can be derived as
γi =
γ0
∣∣v˜HHif1∣∣2
γ0|v˜HHif2|2 + 1
, i ∈ {b, ek}, (3)
where γ0 = 1/σ20 , Hi =
[
Hari
hHai
]
, v˜H = ej$
[
vH , 1
]
and
$ is an arbitrary phase rotation.
B. Problem Formulation
We aim to maximize the achievable secrecy rate via a joint
design of the transmit beamforming and jamming at Alice
and the reflect beamforming at Rose, subject to the total
power constraint at Alice. As such, the optimization problem
is formulated as
(P0) : max
f1,f2,v
{
Rb −max
k
Rek
}
s.t. fH1 f1 + f
H
2 f2 ≤ Pmax,
|vn| = 1, n = 1, ..., N,
where Rb = log2 (1 + γb) and Rek = log2 (1 + γek) are the
achievable rates in bits/second/Hertz (bps/Hz) for Bob and
Eve k, respectively. (P0) is difficult to solve due to the non-
concave objective function as well as the coupled optimization
variables. However, we observe that the resultant problems can
be efficiently solved when one of (f1, f2) and v is fixed. This
thus motivates us to propose an alternating optimization based
algorithm to solve (P0) sub-optimally, by iteratively optimizing
one of (f1, f2) and v with the other being fixed at each iteration
until convergence is reached, as detailed in the next section.
III. JOINT DESIGN OF BEAMFORMING AND JAMMING
A. Optimizing f1 and f2 for Given v
For given v, we denote H˜b = h˜bh˜Hb and H˜ek = h˜ek h˜
H
ek
,
where h˜Hb = v˜
HHb and h˜Hek = v˜
HHek can be viewed as the
effective channels from Alice to Bob and Eve k, respectively,
by combining the direct channel and the IRS-reflected channel.
Then, (P0) can be transformed to the following problem
(P1.1) : max
f1,f2
log2
1+ γ0
∣∣∣h˜Hb f1∣∣∣2
γ0
∣∣∣h˜Hb f2∣∣∣2+1
−max
k
log2
1+ γ0
∣∣∣h˜Hek f1∣∣∣2
γ0
∣∣∣h˜Hek f2∣∣∣2+1

s.t. fH1 f1 + f
H
2 f2 ≤ Pmax.
Note that |h˜Hi f1|
2
= Tr(H˜if1f
H
1 ) and |h˜Hi f2|
2
=
Tr(H˜if2f
H
2 ), i ∈ {b, ek}. Define two matrices as F1 = f1fH1
and F2 = f2fH2 . Then it follows that F1  0, F2  0 and
rank(F1) = rank(F2) = 1. Since the rank-1 constraints are
non-convex, we apply the semidefinite relaxation (SDR) to
relax these constraints. As a result, (P1.1) is reduced to
(P1.2) : max
f1,f2
log2
(
1+
γ0Tr(H˜bF1)
γ0Tr(H˜bF2)+1
)
−max
k
log2
(
1+
γ0Tr(H˜ekF1)
γ0Tr(H˜ekF2)+1
)
s.t. (F1,F2) ∈ F ,
where
F={(F1,F2) |Tr (F1+F2)≤Pmax, F1  0,F2  0}
is the feasible set for (F1,F2). However, (P1.2) is still difficult
to solve since the objective function is not jointly concave with
respect to (w.r.t.) F1 and F2, which are non-trivially coupled
too. To overcome these difficulties, we resort to the following
lemma [9].
Lemma 1. Consider the function ϕ (t) = −tx + ln t + 1 for
any x > 0. Then, we have
− lnx = max
t>0
ϕ (t) , (4)
and the optimal solution is t = 1/x.
Lemma 1 provides an upper bound for ϕ (t), and this bound
is tight when t = 1/x. By applying Lemma 1 and setting
x = γ0Tr(H˜bF2) + 1 and t = tb, Rb can be written as
Rb ln 2=ln
(
γ0Tr
(
H˜b (F1+F2)
)
+1
)
−ln
(
γ0Tr
(
H˜bF2
)
+1
)
=max
tb>0
ϕb (F1,F2, tb), (5)
where
ϕb (F1,F2, tb) = ln
(
γ0Tr
(
H˜b (F1 + F2)
)
+ 1
)
−
tb
(
γ0Tr
(
H˜bF2
)
+ 1
)
+ ln tb + 1. (6)
Similarly, by setting x = γ0Tr
(
H˜ek(F1 + F2)
)
+ 1 and t =
tek , Rek can be expressed as
Rek ln 2=ln
(
γ0Tr
(
H˜ek(F1+F2)
)
+1
)
−ln
(
γ0Tr
(
H˜ekF2
)
+1
)
= min
tek>0
ϕek (F1,F2, tek), (7)
3Algorithm 1: Alternating optimization for solving (P1.1)
Input: Pmax, γ0, v˜, Hb, Hek .
Output: f1, f2.
1 Initialize f1 and f2 according to the maximum transmit
power constraint fH1 f1 + f
H
2 f2 ≤ Pmax.
2 Set m = 1, F(0)1 = f1f
H
1 , F
(0)
2 = f2f
H
2 , h˜
H
b = v˜
HHb,
h˜Hek = v˜
HHek , H˜b = h˜bh˜
H
b , and H˜ek = h˜ek h˜
H
ek
.
3 repeat
4 With given F(m−1)1 and F
(m−1)
2 , find the optimal t
(m)
b
and t(m)ek according to (9) and (10), respectively.
5 With given t(m)b and t
(m)
ek , find the optimal F
(m)
1 and
F
(m)
2 by solving (P1.5).
6 Update m = m+ 1.
7 until the objective value of (P1.1) reaches convergence.
8 Recover f1 and f2 from F1 and F2, respectively.
where
ϕek(F1,F2, tek)=tek
(
γ0Tr
(
H˜ek (F1 + F2)
)
+1
)
−
ln
(
γ0Tr
(
H˜ekF2
)
+1
)
−ln tek−1. (8)
Therefore, following Sion’s minimax theorem [10], (P1.2) can
be rewritten as
(P1.3) : max
F1,F2,tb,tek
{
ϕb(F1,F2, tb)−max
k
ϕek(F1,F2,tek)
}
s.t. (F1,F2) ∈ F ,
tb > 0, tek > 0, k = 1, ...,K.
Note that the constant “ln 2” is omitted in the objective
function without loss of optimality. It can be shown that (P1.3)
is convex w.r.t. either (F1,F2) or (tb, tek). Thus, it can be
solved by applying the alternating optimization technique.
According to Lemma 1, the optimal (tb, tek) for fixed
(F1,F2) can be easily derived in closed-forms as
t∗b =
(
γ0Tr
(
H˜bF2
)
+1
)−1
, (9)
t∗ek =
(
γ0Tr
(
H˜ek (F1+F2)
)
+1
)−1
. (10)
On the other hand, the optimal (F1,F2) for given
(
t∗b , t
∗
ek
)
can be obtained by solving
(P1.4) : max
F1,F2
{
ϕb (F1,F2, t
∗
b)−max
k
ϕek
(
F1,F2,t
∗
ek
)}
s.t. (F1,F2) ∈ F .
Introducing a slack variable t, (P1.4) can be equivalently
written as
(P1.5) : max
F1,F2,t
ϕb (F1,F2, t
∗
b)− t
s.t. ϕek
(
F1,F2,t
∗
ek
) ≤ t, k = 1, ...,K,
(F1,F2) ∈ F .
Since (P1.5) is convex, it can be efficiently solved by using
a convex optimization solver, e.g. CVX. Note that there is no
guarantee that the obtained F1 and F2 are rank-1 matrices
as the rank-1 constraints are dropped in (P1.2) by applying
SDR. If the obtained F1 and F2 are of rank-1, they can
be written as F1 = w1wH1 and F2 = w2w
H
2 by applying
eigenvalue decomposition, and then the optimal f1 and f2 are
given by f1 = w1 and f2 = w2, respectively. Otherwise,
Gaussian randomization is needed for recovering f1 and f2
approximately, for which the details are omitted [2].
In the above, an approximate solution to (P1.1) is obtained
by alternately updating (F1,F2) and (tb, tek), which is sum-
marized in Algorithm 1.
B. Optimizing v for Given f1 and f2
Next, for any given f1 and f2, we denote h¯i = Hif1, H¯i =
h¯ih¯
H
i , hˆi = Hif2, and Hˆi = hˆihˆ
H
i , i ∈ {b, ek}. As a result,
(P0) can be simplified as
(P2.1) :max
v˜
log2
1+ γ0∣∣v˜H h¯b∣∣2
γ0
∣∣∣v˜H hˆb∣∣∣2+1
−max
k
log2
1+ γ0∣∣v˜H h¯ek ∣∣2
γ0
∣∣∣v˜H hˆek ∣∣∣2+1

s.t. |vn| = 1, n = 1, ..., N.
Similarly as for (P1.1), by applying Lemma 1 together with
SDR, the optimization over v˜ for given (f1, f2) is reduced to
(P2.2) : max
V˜,zb,zek
{
ψb
(
V˜, zb
)
−max
k
ψek
(
V˜, zek
)}
s.t. V˜  0, V˜n,n = 1, n = 1, ..., N + 1,
zb > 0, zek > 0, k = 1, ...,K.
where
ψb
(
V˜, zb
)
= ln
(
γ0Tr
((
H¯b + Hˆb
)
V˜
)
+ 1
)
−
zb
(
γ0Tr
(
HˆbV˜
)
+ 1
)
+ ln zb + 1, (11)
and
ψek
(
V˜, zek
)
=zek
(
γ0Tr
((
H¯ek + Hˆek
)
V˜
)
+1
)
−
ln
(
γ0Tr
(
HˆekV˜
)
+ 1
)
− ln zek − 1. (12)
It can be verified that (P2.2) is convex w.r.t. either V˜ or
(zb, zek), with the other being fixed. Similarly, it can be ap-
proximately solved by alternately optimizing V˜ and (zb, zek).
For given V˜, the optimal (zb, zek) is given by
z∗b =
(
γ0Tr
(
HˆbV˜
)
+1
)−1
, (13)
z∗ek =
(
γ0Tr
((
H¯ek + Hˆek
)
V˜
)
+1
)−1
. (14)
While for given
(
z∗b , z
∗
ek
)
, the optimal V˜ is given by
V˜∗=arg max
V˜n,n=1
{
ψb
(
V˜, z∗b
)
−max
k
ψek
(
V˜, z∗ek
)}
, (15)
which can be solved similarly as (P1.5).
After extracting v˜ from V˜ by eigenvalue decomposition
with Gaussian randomization, the reflection coefficients are
obtained as
vn = e
j ∠( v˜nv˜N+1 ), n = 1, ..., N, (16)
where the constraints |vn| = 1, ∀n, are satisfied.
C. Overall Algorithm
To summarize, the overall iterative algorithm to solve (P0)
is given in Algorithm 2, where  denotes a small threshold
and L is the maximum number of iterations.
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Fig. 2: Simulation setups.
Algorithm 2: Alternating optimization for solving (P0)
Input: Pmax, γ0, Hb, Hek , , L.
Output: f1, f2, v.
1 Initialize the reflection coefficients vector as v(0).
2 Set l = 1, v˜(0) =
[
v(0)
1
]
.
3 repeat
4 Solve (P1.1) for given v˜(l−1) by applying Algorithm
1, and denote the solution as f (l)1 and f
(l)
2 .
5 Solve (P2.1) for given f (l)1 and f
(l)
2 , and denote the
solution as v˜(l).
6 Update l = l + 1.
7 until the fractional decrease of the objective value in
(P0) is below  or l = L .
8 Recover v from v˜ according to (16).
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
The simulation setups are shown in Fig. 2. It is assumed
that Alice, Rose and Bob are located at (5, 0, 20), (0, 100, 2),
and (3, 100, 0) in meter (m), respectively. To study the effect
of jamming, we consider two different setups in Fig. 2 where
the K Eves lie uniformly along the line from (2, 95, 0) to (2,
105, 0) in Setup (a) and from (2, −105, 0) to (2, −95, 0) in
Setup (b), thus corresponding to the cases with local Eves and
remote Eves near/from the IRS, respectively.
The channel from i (i ∈ {a, r}) to j (j ∈ {b, ek}) is gener-
ated by hij =
√
L0d
−cij
ij gij , where L0 = −30 dB denotes the
path loss at the reference distance d0 = 1 m, dij denotes the
distance from i to j, and cij denotes the corresponding path
loss exponent. Besides, the small-scale fading component gij
is assumed to be Rician fading and given by
gij =
√
βij
1 + βij
gLoSij +
√
1
1 + βij
gNLoSij , (17)
where βij is the Rician factor, while gLoSij and g
NLoS
ij represent
the deterministic line-of-sight (LoS) and Rayleigh fading/non-
LoS (NLoS) components, respectively. The same channel
model is adopted for Har. We assume that the channels from
Alice to Bob, Rose, and Eve k have no LoS component and
experience Rayleigh fading with the path loss exponents and
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Fig. 3: Achievable secrecy rate versus the maximum transmit
power, Pmax, with (M,N,K) = (4, 20, 5).
Rician factors being set as cab = caek = 5 and βab = βaek =
βar = 0. Considering that Rose is deployed vertically higher
than Bob and Eves, a less scattering environment is expected
and thus we set car = 3.5. In Setup (a), we assume that
the channels from Rose to Bob and Eve k are LoS. The
corresponding path loss exponents and Rician factors are set
as crb = crek = 2 and βrb = βrek = ∞. While in Setup (b),
we assume that the channel from Rose to Eve k experiences
Rayleigh fading, i.e. crek = 5 and βrek = 0. The other
parameters are set as follows: σ20 = −105 dBm,  = 10−3
and L = 40.
In addition to the proposed design for the case with IRS and
AN (AN, IRS), other cases including with AN but without
IRS (AN, No-IRS) [9], with IRS but without AN (No-AN,
IRS), and without both IRS and AN (No-AN, No-IRS) are
also adopted for performance comparison. Note that by setting
f2 = 0 (i.e., the case of No-AN, IRS) and K = 1, the setup
is the same as that considered in [5].
The achievable secrecy rate versus the transmit power of
Alice is plotted in Fig. 3. It can be observed that as the
transmit power increases, the AN-aided designs outperform
their counterparts without AN, for both the cases with and
without the IRS in both Setups (a) and (b). Note that the
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Fig. 4: Achievable secrecy rate versus the number of Eves, K,
with (M,N,Pmax) = (4, 20, 40 dBm).
achievable secrecy rates for both Setups (a) and (b) are
identical for the cases without IRS due to the symmetry of
Eves’ locations at the two sides of Alice. In fact, as Pmax goes
to ∞, 1+γb1+max
k
γek
converges to a constant, which implies that
increasing transmit power alone is inefficient for improving
Rs and incorporating AN is beneficial.
Fig. 4 shows the secrecy rate gains achieved by using
AN with increasing the number of Eves, K. Note that when
K = 1, the secrecy rates with and without AN are almost
the same, regardless of whether IRS is used or not. This is
expected because the number of transmit antennas is much
larger than that of Eves and thus transmit beamforming has
sufficient spatial DoF to suppress the signal in the Eves’
direction, rendering the use of AN unnecessary. However, as
the number of Eves increases, transmit beamforming lacks
sufficient DoF for signal nulling and thus it becomes more
beneficial to allocate part of transmit power to send jamming
signal for degrading the reception of Eves. Interestingly, in
Setup (a), it is observed that the case of (AN, No-IRS) even
outperforms that of (No-AN, IRS) when K ≥ 6. This implies
that, in this more challenging setup with both Bob and Eves
near Rose (IRS), AN is particularly useful, as the additional
DoF provided by IRS may be insufficient to prevent the
information leakage to Eves due to their proximity to the IRS
as Bob.
Fig. 5 depicts the achievable secrecy rate versus the number
of reflecting elements of the IRS, N . It is observed that
even with IRS, the AN-aided design requires less reflecting
elements to achieve the same secrecy rate as compared to the
No-AN design. It is also observed that the performance gain
by using AN decreases with increasing N in Setup (a), while
it remains almost unchanged in Setup (b). This is expected
since in Setup (a), more DoF become available for the passive
beamforming of the IRS with larger N to degrade the reception
at the Eves, which thus renders the use of AN less effective.
However, when the Eves are far away from the IRS in Setup
(b), the reflect beamforming of the IRS is fully exploited to
enhance the desired signal at the Bob’s receiver, but without
the need of nulling/canceling the signals at the Eves that are
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Fig. 5: Achievable secrecy rate versus the number of reflecting
elements of the IRS, N , with (M,K,Pmax) = (4, 5, 40 dBm).
out of its coverage. As a result, the performance gain due to
AN is roughly constant regardless of N .
Finally, it is observed from Figs. 3-5 that Setup (b) always
achieves higher secrecy rate than Setup (a) for the case with
IRS, regardless of whether AN is used or not. The reason
is that in Setup (a), the Eves are in the same local region
as Bob covered by Rose (IRS), and as a result it becomes
more challenging to degrade the reception of the Eves, for the
design of both transmit beamforming with/without AN and
reflect beamforming of the IRS.
V. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we proposed a joint design of transmit/reflect
beamforming with AN to secure an IRS-aided wireless com-
munication system in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers.
We developed an alternating optimization based algorithm to
solve this design problem efficiently and showed by simu-
lations the scenarios where the joint use of IRS and AN is
most beneficial, to provide useful insights for practical system
design.
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